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Health, Education, and Welfare

Reforming Medicare: Options, Tradeoffs, and
Opportunities. By Henry J. Aaron and Jeanne
M. Lambrew. With Patrick F. Healey. A
Century Foundation Book. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2008. Pp. xi, 202.
$28.95. ISBN 978–0–8157–0124–8.

JEL 2008–1315
Medicare needs fixing. The program has its
strengths; it is popular among beneficiaries, has
very low administrative costs (maybe too low),
and, since its inception, has greatly reduced
financial risk exposure among beneficiaries.
Nevertheless, it is unaffordable and inefficient.
Jeanne Lambrew and Henry Aaron take up both
of these challenges for Medicare reform in great
detail in Reforming Medicare.
Even for well-seasoned readers of the annual
health spending accounts, Aaron and Lambrew’s
table of projected Medicare spending registers
quite a shock (table 3-4, p. 45). Because predicting cost growth for health care seventy years
out is a fool’s errand, albeit a legally mandated
one, one should not worry too much about the
longest range estimates. The more reliable, near
term estimates, however, look exceptionally grim.
Assuming that the only source of cost growth is
from changes in the number and demographics of
Medicare beneficiaries related to the inclusion of
the baby boomers—an unrealistically low rate of
growth—Medicare spending will account for 3.9

percent of GDP by 2020 (compared to 3.1 percent
in 2007). Using CBO projections that assume a
reduction in physician payments by about 5 percent annually through 2016, a reduction that
seems implausible given Congress’ inability to
make such reductions stick in the past, Medicare
spending will be 4.7 percent of GDP by 2020. If
these numbers are not sufficiently dramatic to
rouse the reader, consider that “[b]etween 2008
and 2018, Medicare’s share of non-interest federal spending is expected to rise from 14.8 to 17.1
percent” (p. 9).
This level of spending may very well be worth
it (David M. Cutler 2004), but funding must
be found somewhere. Medicare’s Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund will spend more than it
collects in 2009 and, according to its Trustees,
is once again on its way to insolvency (Trustees
of the Social Security and Medicare trust funds
2009). Congress’ response to the Trustee’s even
gloomier predictions in 1996 and 1997, when the
reports predicted insolvency in only four or five
years, was to cut waste, focusing on fraud-ridden
home health care billings.
Addressing widespread inefficiencies in
Medicare, and American medicine more generally, is a part of the right strategy. Aaron and
Lambrew survey the many sources of quality
deficiencies in the health care system: (1) outdated treatment, (2) overuse, underuse, and misuse, (3) low value spending, (4) iatrogenic injury,
and (5) dramatic geographic variation in spending
(p. 33, et seq.). While policymakers have recently
embraced reductions in small area spending variation as the magic health reform bullet, Aaron
and Lambrew offer a more restrained analysis.
In page after detailed page, they demonstrate
the difficulty of translating research into quality
improvements and cost savings, making clear that
no single policy response will solve our problems
(see, e.g., p. 42).
In the heart of the book, Aaron and Lambrew
outline three possible reforms: strengthening
Medicare as a social insurance system, premium
support, and consumer-directed Medicare.
They argue that although each has its strengths
and weaknesses, the first—which is based on
the notion that beneficiaries are entitled to the
same, defined benefits—is the most promising. This view turns out to have been prescient.

Book Reviews
With President Obama’s election, the recent and
widespread loss of faith in fully private market
solutions, and a Congress eager for reform, the
remaining two policy prescriptions are probably
off the table for Medicare. Aaron and Lambrew’s
analysis of the remaining two options is nonetheless still useful; even if they are not viable as public sector reforms for now, they remain models
for private sector reform. Employers, therefore,
may wish to consult Reforming Medicare before
following Whole Foods’ example of addressing
selection and unsustainable premium growth by
offering its employees only one plan. The grocery
chain offers a health savings account coupled
with Whole Food’s paying the entire premium for
a high-deductible, catastrophic coverage plan.
Reforming Medicare is essential reading for
anyone who wants to understand the background
of the current health care reform urgency. It is
an excellent and current primer for policymakers, benefits managers, students, and scholars.
Because the authors are central players on the
Democratic policy stage, the book is also a window into the thinking and analysis that have
gone into the current health care reform effort.
Nevertheless, Reforming Medicare should not be
read alone.
The major obstacle to reform has not been that
policymakers (or stakeholders, or even voters)
cannot reason through the strengths and weaknesses or the economic effects of various reform
proposals. They can, and they do. Decades of
previous attempts have failed not only because
health care is complex, but also because of the
“limitations of our political system and the power
of the interest groups—doctors, hospitals, insurers, drug companies, researchers, and even
patient advocates—that have a direct stake in
it” (Tom Daschle 2008, p. xiii). It is the political
economy of health reform, not only the technical policy prescriptions, that desperately needs
our attention. Fortunately, Lambrew addresses
these issues in another, albeit less scholarly, book
on health reform that she published last year—
Critical: What We Can Do about the HealthCare Crisis, by Senator Tom Daschle with Scott
Greenberger and Lambrew.
All reforms have winners and losers, and those
parties are paying more attention to the technical details of health policy than almost all other
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Americans. This has been true since the start
of Medicare, and has continued to make it difficult for Congress to base its decisions on the
best scientific evidence regarding cost or medical effectiveness. Organized patient-group advocacy was key to the process that led Congress to
grant Medicare coverage to anyone diagnosed
with end-stage renal disease (ESRD), regardless
of age and despite the fact that ESRD was not a
uniquely expensive or deadly disease at the time
(Marilyn Moon 1993). Physician groups have successfully lobbied Congress to override Medicare’s
Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR), the target rate
of growth in spending on physician services,
every year since it was passed in 1997 based on
the argument that the formula is flawed.
More recently, there has been widespread
industry opposition to using comparative effectiveness studies in making coverage determinations. Congress overcame opposition to provisions
in the stimulus bill that would fund new comparative effectiveness research, but attempts at
broadening the role of such research in the health
system will be opposed by advocates who worry
that it will be used to restrict Medicare coverage decisions (Jerry Avorn 2009). Similarly, the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, which may
only approve new treatments within benefit categories (Congress must approve all new benefit
categories) and must cover treatments that are
“reasonable and necessary” for diagnosis and
treatment, has faced strong protest from patient,
provider, and industry groups when they have
tried to limit payment for high-cost treatments of
uncertain benefit, such as anti-anemia bio-pharmaceuticals and off-label use of colorectal cancer
chemotherapies (Patricia Seliger Keenan, Peter J.
Neumann, and Kathryn A. Phillips 2006).
These examples illustrate why it is critical that,
in this round of health reform, health policy
scholars consider not only lessons from health
economics but also lessons from political economy. (They will play out dramatically if the tax
status of health insurance, once seen as sacrosanct, remains on the reform table as it seems to
be now).
In addition, Critical is a nice place to continue
where Reforming Medicare leaves off, placing
Medicare in the context of overall health reform.
As Aaron and Lambrew conclude:
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Medicare, though important, accounts
for less than a quarter of personal health
care spending. Systemic reforms in the U.S.
health care system would do far more to control Medicare spending than any reform in
the program alone. Policies such as promulgating an evidence-based benefit design,
steering patients toward high-value services,
and reorienting payment policy toward the
prevention of acute and chronic disease
have the potential to curtail spending across
the population, not just among the elderly.
Systemwide health reform is the best way
to make Medicare economically sustainable
and enable it to provide beneficiaries with
high-quality and affordable health care. (p.
137, emphasis added)
Medicare faces many of the same problems
as health insurance for the rest of the population, including variation in treatment and quality, reimbursement linked to individual services
rather than episodes of illness, and fragmentation among doctors and payment systems. Since
“[s]ome of Medicare’s quality shortcomings are
endemic to the U.S. Health system,” proposals to
reform Medicare may apply to the entire health
care system (p. 116).
But as Aaron and Lambrew note, Medicare
does not operate in a vacuum. Medicare policy
affects health care for the nonelderly, and health
policy for the nonelderly affects Medicare. The
very enactment of Medicare, for example, had
enormous spillover effects on the American
health care system. Amy Finkelstein (2007) has
estimated that the implementation of Medicare
caused six times more hospital spending than what
similar increases in individual insurance take-up,
rather than through a public program, would have
predicted. The generosity of the Medicare benefit
package directly affects the size and characteristics of the retiree population seeking health insurance from their former employers and through
the private Medigap insurance market.
Similarly, health policy developments outside
of the program also affect Medicare. The HMO
Act of 1973, coupled with ERISA in 1974, paved
the way for the growth of HMOs within the
employer-financed health insurance sector that,
eventually in 1997, led to the introduction of

Medicare managed care through the introduction of Medicare Part C (aka “Medicare+Choice,”
now known as “Medicare Advantage”). A new
and large group of retirees leaving the private
work force, where virtually no one gets fee-forservice medicine, will bring with them their
expectations that they must ask for permission
before using health care resources, even if they
despise doing so. Experience with such techniques among new beneficiaries will likely make
care management reforms in Medicare more
politically palatable.
Reforming Medicare offers a subtle analysis of
Medicare’s problems and the trade-offs among
three major approaches to addressing them. As a
briefing book for a policy analyst, teaching tool,
or reference, the book has great strengths, including its analysis of new programs like Medicare
Part D. We need answers to questions Aaron and
Lambrew address, such as “What gets covered?,”
“How should we decide?,” “How much will it
cost?,” and “Who pays?” But we also need to know
what those decisions mean for the distribution
of health and wealth. Only then can we understand, and engage, the interests that will support or oppose reform. Fortunately, in addition to
Reforming Medicare, Lambrew provides another
source to begin the political economy inquiry.
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